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ABSTRACT
Monetary policies in the U.S., Japan, Germany and the United
Kingdom over the period 1973—1986 are compared and evaluated, with the
aim of drawing lessons for monetary policy from the recent historical
record. All four countries shifted during this period to money
targeting, though with differing degrees of commitment, seriousness and
persistence. The Bundesbank and the Bank of Japan each focus on one
money target, described by the Bundesbank as a target, and by the Bank
of Japan as a proJection. None of the countries has stuck rigorously to
the taraets, though the Bank of Japan has come close.
The most striking contrast in the outcomes of policy is between
Japan and Germany in the second oil shock. Both their central banks
must by that stage have acquired significant anti—inflationary
reputations. Nonetheless, whereas the rate of increase of nominal wages
in Japan fell to accommodate the increased price of oil, and Japan
avoided a recession, the rate of wage increase in Germany increased, and
was followed by a serious recession. The cause of the difference in
results appears to lie much less in the credibility of the policyinakers
than in the behavior of wage—earners. Differences between the outcomes
of policy in the U.S. and U.K. also suggest that the role of the
reputation of policymakers is at best extremely difficult to quantify.
Outcomes in all countries suggest that monetary rules that do not
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In the period since 1973 each of the major economies has
succeeded in reducina the inflation rate after suffering the
inflationary impacts of the two oil shocks. In this paper I analyze the
policy choices——with the emphasis on monetary policy——and tradeoffs that
resulted in lower inflation for the United States, Japan, Germany and
the United KincTdom.
The extraordinary stability of inflation, output growth and
monetary growth in both Japan and Germany after the first oil shock
appear to support the view that adherence to stable preannounced money
growth tarqets is the key to macroeconomic stability. The remarkable
stability of U.S. growth combined with low inflation in the period since
1984 in the face of unprecedented variability of monetary growth casts
some doubt on that presumption. The main aim of this paper is to draw
lessons for monetary policy from the recent historical record.
I start with an overview of macroeconomic developments in the
four countries in the period 1972 to 1986, from the collapse of the
Bretton Woods system, through the two oil shocks and into the
'Department of Economics, MIT, and NBER. This paper was prepared for
the Third International Conference of the Institute for Monetary and
Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, June 1987. and will appear in Monetary
and Economic Studies.I am grateful to Phillip Cagan, Rudiger
Dornbusch, Robert Feldman, Karen Johnson and Masahiko Takeda for helpful
discussions, Takeo Hoshi for research assistance, Data Resources Inc.
and Takashi Oyama of the Bank of Japan for data, and the National
Science Foundation for financial support.2
disinflationary eighties. Economic policy decisions in the four
countries during the two oil shocks are examined more closely in Section
11.2 In Section III I describe the different monetary targeting and,
briefly, short—run operating procedures of policy in the four countries.
The paper concludes with a discussion of the lessons of this period for
monetary targeting and policy, the role of the credibility of
policymakers, and the flexible exchange rate system.3
I. Shocks and Policy Responses.
Basic macroeconomic developments in the four economies for the
period 1972—1986 are summarized in Figures 1, 2, and 3, which present
information on real GNP growth, inflation (measured by the CPI4), and
unemployment respectively, and in Table 1. The period has seen a
slowing of real GNP growth in all four countries, a slowing of
inflation, and an increase in unemployment. The increases in the
German and United Kingdom unemployment rates stand out. There was in
1986 a remarkable convergence of GNP growth rates and, to a lesser
2Meltzer (1985) examines shocks and policy decisions in japan and the
U.S. in the fixed and floating exchange rate periods. His econometric
emphasis is on policy reactions to all types of shocks, whereas this
paper presents a less formal examination of policy responses in four
countries to the two oil shocks.
3Meek (1983) contains several very informative papers on monetary policy
procedures in major economies.
4lnflation rates of the GNP deflator and the CPI often differ
significantly over this period. For instance, although CPI inflation
for the United States exceeded 10% on a year over year basis four times,
GNP deflator inflation never rose into the double digits. In 1986 when
CPI inflation rates in Germany and Japan were —0.2% and 0.6%
respectively, GNP deflators rose by 3.0% and 2.3%.
These are QECD—standardized measures of unemployment. The German data
here are lower than the national statistics.3
extent, inflation rates, though there were wide disparities in
unemployment rates among the four economies.

















Source: OECD Economic Outlook, December1986,and Data Resources,
Inc.
Note: Unemployment data are OECD—standardized definition.
The oil shocks are clearly visible in the behavior of the
inflation rate in Figure 2. The first oil shock sharply raised the
inflation rate in the U.S., Japan and the U.K., but caused barely a
ripple in German inflation. The second oil shock produced rapid
increases in inflation in the U.S. and the U.K., a 7.8% (CPI) inflation
rate for 1980 in Japan, and more than 6% per annum (CPI) inflation in
Germany. In the second oil shock, CPI inflation rates for Germany,
Japan, and the U.S. were well above rates of increase of the GNP
deflator:6 in the case of Japan the year over year CPI inflation rate
6A data appendix that contains all the data referred to in the paper and
presented in the figures is available from the author on request.4
for 1980 of 7.8% contrasts with just 3.8% on the GNP deflator.7
Each oil shock was followed by a significant slowdown in growth
or a recession, with one exception. Japan, which had grown at double
digit rates in the sixties and at more than 8% per annum in 1972—73
suffered the trauma of a recession in 1974. Its year over year growth
rate never reached 5.5% thereafter, though it remained the most rapidly
growing of the major economies. Japanese growth slowed very little
during the second oil shock; over the entire ten year period starting in
1976 Japanese annual real GNP growth was remarkably stable at rates
between 3.1% and 5.3% per annum.
Germany suffered recessions during both oil shocks; unemployment
rose to a new higher level after each, and has only recently shown
modest signs of reduction. The U.K. similarly experienced a recession
with each oil shock and a step increase in the level of unemployment to
a new higher level with virtually no signs of improvement thereafter.
The pattern for the U.S. was different. The first oil shock
recession was followed by a rapid recovery and decline in unemployment.
The second oil shock produced two recessions8, the second with the
highest unemployment rate of the post—World War II period. Rapid
recovery again brought the unemployment rate down quite fast, but it
nonetheless remains above 1973 estimates of the natural rate of about
7Because of its inappropriate treatment of housing prices, the U.S. CPI
significantly mismeasured inflation in the period before 1982. For
instance, the 13.5% for 1980 seen in Figure 2 is less than 12% when
calculated on the basis of the corrected CPI introduced after 1982.
8Because the 1980 recession lasted only six months and the recovery from
that recession a year, it is sometimes argued that the entire period
from the beginning of 1980 to the end of 1982 should be regarded as one
long recession.5
5.5%, and even above most current estimates of the natural rate of about
6%.
Not so evident in the figures is the effects of the U.S. fiscal
policy shock of 1981—83 and accompanying fiscal tightening in the other
three countries. Some of the effects show up in rapid U.S. recovery
from the 1981—82 recession and slower recovery in the other economies;
others are reflected in the current account changes seen in Table 1.
I now review in more detail the policy choices made in each
country during the two oil shocks.
II. Dealing with the Oil Shocks.
The first oil shock hit a booming world economy that had
recently abandoned the Bretton Woods system. Raw material prices were
already rising fast as domestic inflation rates rose. Free from the
constraints of pegged exchange rates, countries believed they could
pursue their own goals with little outside constraint. In the case of
Germany the goal was low inflation; in Britain it was the maintenance of
high growth. Real growth in Britain at 7.9% in 1973 for a short while
matched the Japanese rate. In 1973, even before the oil price shock,
inflation was high in the United States as a result of expansionary
monetary and fiscal policy, and the ending of wage and price controls.
It was higher in Britain and much higher in Japan.
Monetary growth data for the period are shown in Figure 49
9Tablesin the appendix provide the data underlying each figure. All
growth rates are at annual rates for the quarter relative to the same
quarter a year before. Figure 4 shows for each country that monetary
variable that receives most attention from the monetary policymakers: Ml
in the U.S., (M2+CD's) in Japan; Central Bank Money in Germany; and
sterling M3 in the U.K. Growth rates for a variety of monetary
variables for each country are presented in Tables A—4.6
Money growth in both the U.K. and Japan exceeded 20% per annum in 1972
and 197310. Such growth rates of money had been common in Japan during
her high growth period, but not in Britain. The growth rate of both Ml
and M2 was sharply reduced in Japan at the end of 1973, before the oil
price shock hit, but money growth in the U.K. (M2) was still 27.5%
(quarter over same quarter a year earlier) in the fourth quarter of
1973. U.s.Mland M2 growth were reduced in 1973. With the shift to a
floating exchange rate allowing Germany to pursue its domestic inflation
goals, the growth rate of central bank money in Germany was cut
drastically in the second quarter of 1973. Thus by the time of the oil
price increase money growth rates were being reduced in three of the
four countries.And if monetary policy is judged by the nominal
interest rate (Figure 5), monetary policy had turned tight in Britain
too in mid—1973.1'
In the next year higher oil prices fed through into higher
inflation in each country. Although there were deflationary forces in
place already, the high inflation and continuing high wage growth
reinforced the resolve of the monetary authorities in each country to
keep money growth low'2. With the oil shock adding to the rate of
'°This applies to both Ml and M2 growth rates in Japan, and M2 and
sterling M3 in the U.K. U.K. Ml growth was 14% in 1972 but only 5% in
1973.
''In this period money growth was not taken as a measure of the thrust
of monetary policy in Britain. Even if it were, the differences between
the growth of Ml, which fell drastically after the middle of 1973, and
the growth rates of M2 and M3 would have complicated the interpretation
of policy. It was in large part the correlation between N3 growth in
1973 and 1974 with the subsequent inflation that led to its later use as
a monetary target.
12U.K. money growth began to fall from the second quarter of 1974.7
inflation, real balances in each country were falling, putting further
pressure on interest rates and demand. Nominal interest rates stayed
high through 1974, though they were falling rapidly in Germany.
Slowdowns or recessions began in each country in the first
quarter of 1974. In part because the nature of cost shocks were not
then well understood, and because the unemployment rate was slow to
rise, the slowdowns did not cause any change in policy. Given the short
lag between the oil price increase and the start of the recessions, the
recessions must already have been en route, and would have taken place
as a result of the tightening of policies in mid—1973 even without the
oil price increase.
The oil price rise served rather to intensify the recessions, as
high inflation, continued low unemployment and rapid wage growth kept
monetary and fiscal policy tight through 1974. In the U.S. the main
thrust of policy until almost the end of 1974 was to fight inflation.
Both Ml and 112 money growth were kept low and the Treasury bill rate
held high (Figure 5). There was a small full employment surplus in 1974
(Figure 6), and proposals for a tax increase to deal with the inflation.
Rates of wage increase (Figure 10) stayed high through 1974 as inflation
accelerated.
In Japan money growth was well below the 20% rate of inflation
in 1974, with the result that real balances fell and interest rates
increased. With the monetary squeeze, real GNP growth (Figure 9) turned
negative at the beginning of 1974, and stayed negative (quarter over
same quarter a year before) throughout the year. But rates of wage8
increase and inflation remained above 20%, for another year. By the end
of 1974 the inflation rate in Japan was beginning to fall though wage
increases were still rapid, and the government budget was moving into a
larger deficit.
Money growth was kept low in Germany through 1974. Real GNP
growth was low in 1974, turning negative at the end of year and for most
of 1975. High rates of wage increase continued through 1974, inflation
still stayed high, while unemployment remained below 2%. M2 and M3
growth were reduced in Britain in mid—1974 with interest rates and the
government budget deficit remaining high. In Britain the rate of wage
increase was accelerating at the end of 1974.
Only at the end of 1974 did unemployment start rising in each
country. At that point interest rates in the U.S. and Germany were
falling fast. The seriousness of the recession struck home in the U.S.
at the end of 1974, leading in March 1975 to a fiscal stimulus in the
form of a $50 per taxpayer check, visible in Figure 6 in the sharp
temporary increase in the full employment deficit. The recession, high
rates of wage increase and high inflation continued well into 1975, with
the unemployment rate peaking in the second quarter. Monetary growth
(Ml) was procyclical in this recession, falling through the first
quarter of 1975, and only then beginning to increase. Even so, the
annual growth rate of Ml (quarter over the same quarter a year before)
did riot exceed 6% over the entire three years starting in 1973:4. M2
growth too fell sharply in the recession but then increased to more than
10% for the two years following the end of the recession. Inflation9
fell rapidly after the middle of 1975, and by the time of the election
campaign at the end of 1976 CPI inflation was at less than 5%•13Wage
increases were still at double—digit rates into 1975, and did not fall
to much below 8% even after the recession.
The decisive change in Japanese inflation cane at the end of
1974 and the beginning of 1975, with the new wage agreement in 1975
reducing wage inflation by more than 10%. At the same time nominal
interest rates began to decline, and money growth was raised. The
central government budget deficit began to increase from 1975, and
continued rising until it reached more than 5.4% of GNP in 1978.14 The
recovery of real growth started early in 1975.
In Germany central bank money growth was raised at the beginning
of the year. Inflation and rates of wage increase too declined from
early 1975, real GN? growth turned around at about the same time as in
the United States, though unemployment peaked in the last quarter.
The recession and inflation lasted longer in the U.K; indeed
there were two separate periods of negative real GD? growth in 1974 and
1975. Wage inflation was sharply reduced during 1975, moving from a
(quarter over same quarter a year earlier) peak of 32% in 1975:1 to
21.5% in 1975:4. Inflation moved into the low teens in 1976 as money
growth continued well below the inflation rate through 1975 and nominal
interest rates remained high. Despite a renewal of growth in 1976, the
unemployment rate in the U.K. continued rising until the end of 1977,
when it reached 6.3%, compared with 2.6% at the end of 1973.
13GNP deflator inflation never fell much below 6%, the difference again
resulting in part from the incorrect treatment of the costs of housing.
'4Data are from Hamada and Hayashi (1985), pp.86—87.10
Perhaps the most revealing contrast in this period is that
between the U.K. and Japan. Before the recession and oil price shock,
both countries had high rates of money growth. In 1973 Britain had
lower price and wage inflation, suggesting that inflationary pressures
for 1974 were higher in Britain with her lower rate of growth of
potential output. Japanese money growth was decisively reduced at the
end of 1973; it took longer in Britain. Output growth turned negative
at the same time in both countries in 1974 but recovered somewhat during
that year. However, the Japanese recession represented a much larger
reduction in growth below trend rates than the British recession. In
both countries rates of wage increase rose in 1974, more so though in
Britain.
The decisive difference occurs at the beginning of 1975, when
Japanese wage inflation fell sharply in the new wage agreement, but
British wage inflation continued high through the end of the year. With
money growth (broader definitions) kept down in Britain in 1975 and wage
increases continuing at high rates, further recession occurred.1
Inflation in the UK came down from the 20% range to the low teens at the
end of 1976, but stayed in double dicits virtually through the remainder
of the decade.
What are the lessons of this episode? First, the fact that the
oil shock hit overheated economies made dealing with the shock more
difficult. But it is in the nature of such shocks that they are more
'5Onceagainthe different money stocks givedifferentsignals in
Britain as Mi. growth was relatively high in 1975. Nominal interest
rates were held in the double digits but real interest rates were still
substantially negative.11
likely to occur when demand is booming than when economies are in
recession. Second, it may be argued that the fact that an oil price
increase is both inflationary and recessionary means that monetary
policy was too restrictive for too long. Certainly Japan brought about
a big recession measured by the loss of potential output. Quite likely
a more gradual reduction in the growth rate of money in Japan, and some
accommodation of inflationary pressures in 1974 in the US and Germany
would have moderated the recessions, at the cost of a less rapid
reduction in inflation. Third, through the end of the recession
exchange rates moved surprisingly little (Figure 7). The DN appreciated
in the first half of 1973, the yen and sterling depreciated during the
recession as implied by their greater inflation, but exchange rate
movements did not play a large part in the adjustment to the oil shock.
Fourth, it is difficult not to give the behavior of wages an independent
role in the story. Japanese inflation fell fast after rates of wage
increase came down; U.K. inflation stayed high with high wage inflation.
Later in the paper I examine whether the credibility of the policymakers
in the two countries explains the difference.
In both Germany and Japan monetary policy was in part guided by
the hope of establishing the credibility of the central bank's
determination to maintain low inflation in the new floating exchange
rate world. The recessions could be viewed as investments in
reputation, which paid off in the case of Japan in the second oil
crisis. That leaves open the question of why there was not a similar
payoff for Germany.12
After the first oil shock German and Japanese monetary policies
were embarked on new anti—inflationary courses. Despite the
introduction of monetary targeting in 1975, there appears to have been
no significant change in the nature of U.S. monetary policy, and U.K.
monetary policy was still difficult to understand. (Fischer, 1987)
In the years between the oil shocks the U.S. economy showed
rapid growth and declining unemployment from 1976 to 1978 while
inflation increased; Japan grew rapidly, albeit slowly by its historical
standards, with slowing inflation; German growth was moderate with
slowly falling unemployment while inflation remained at around 4%; the
U.K. succeeded in reducing the unemployment rate slightly, while the
inflation rate except in 1978 remained in double digits.
In retrospect, it is clear that U.S. monetary policy in the
period between the oil shocks was too expansionary, even though money
growth rates did not rise much. Rather, the rapid growth and rising
inflation were accompanied by an increasing velocity of circulation (the
case of the missing money). In Japan gradually slowing money growth was
accompanied by a rising budget deficit to 1978. The possibility of
countercyclical fiscal policy was neutralized by the existence of a
massive budget deficit, a condition that is familiar in the U.S.
Central bank money growth in Germany remained around 8-11% for the
period until 1980. Noney growth and budget deficits in the U.K. were
high through the end of the decade.
The Second Oil Shock.13
The real price of oil fell from the end of 1976 until the
beginning of 1979, then virtually doubled within the next year,
continuing its increase until the middle of 1981. With unemployment
continuing to fall in the United States and rates of wage increase
rising, the second oil shock like the first hit an economy that was
already operating close to full capacity and with high inflation. The
other major countries too had grown rapidly in 1978.
In the U.S. the falling dollar during 1978 had led to a change
in monetary policy at the end of that year. Both Ml and M2 growth were
slightly lower in 1979 than in 1978, and interest rates were higher.
Inflation nonetheless increased, with the CPI rising 13.3% during 1979.
The GNP deflator grew 8.8%, year over year in 1979, and at virtually the
same rate during the year. Rising interest rates and oil prices account
for the more than 4% difference between CPI and GNP deflator inflation.
Paul Voicker was appointed Chairman of the Fed in August 1979.
Confronted with rising inflation, and continued dollar weakness, the Fed
in November 1979 made its decision to stem the inflation. Accompanying
this decision, the Fed declared a change in its operating procedures to
place far more weight on meeting its monetary targets and to reduce the
emphasis put on interest rates.
CPI inflation rates exceeding 18% per annum in the first quarter
of 1980 led to a panic imposition of credit controls in March 1980,
intensifying an extraordinarily short sharp recession that can now be
seen to have started in January 1980. Ml growth was cut to negative
rates in the second quarter of 1980, and then raised as the extent of14
the recession became clear. The recession ended in the middle of 1980
with CpI inflation down but GNP deflator inflation little reduced, and
with inflation outpacing money growth and thereby reducing real
balances. Interest rates had fallen rapidly in the recession but
rebounded just as rapidly and moved to new highs at the start of the
1981—82 recession. It was during this period that the Fed maintained
the monetary pressure that broke the inflationay momentum. Money growth
was kept low into 1982.
The Fed kept up the pressure——visible both in low money growth
and high nominal interest rates——through August 1982, by which tine it
was clear the inflation rate had fallen and that unemployment was rising
rapidly. In August 1982, the start of the international debt crisis,
the Fed announced the end of the monetary policy inaugurated three years
earlier. Money growth was increased sharply, interest rates were driven
down, fueling the recovery that began at the end of 1982. A second
expansionary force came from the i?ajor tax cuts that went into effect in
1982; a third was the decline in the price of oil that began in 1982.
The U.S. took a long time to deal with the second oil shock,
with the imposition of credit controls and the 1980 recession probably
prolonging the adjustment period. Rates of wage increase started
falling rapidly only after the middle of 1981, and by the end of 1982——
with the unemployment rate above 10.5%——had fallen to less than half
their 10.8% level at the start of 1981. They have continued falling
since then, as disinflation has continued.15
Ml growth since 1982 has been on average higher than over any
other four year period since World War II, and except in 1984 well above
its target ranges.112 growth has continued relatively smoothly, within
its target ranges. Nominal interest rates were actually higher in 1984
than in 1982 and 1983, but subsequently fell, reducing the real interest
rate.
The great success of Japanese macroeconomic policy was the
avoidance of a recession in the second oil shock. Money growth was cut
at the end of 1979 and kept down into 1981. The nominal interest rate
rose rapidly, growth slowed somewhat, inflation rose, real growth fell
especially in 1981, but still during 1981 real GNP grew 2.5%. Wage
inflation was falling over this entire period, thereby avoiding the
pass—through of higher prices into wages. Japan was thus spared the
choice between accommodation and a wage—price spiral, or a recession,
perhaps because that choice had already been made once before. Once it
was clear that inflation was under control, the Bank of Japan permitted
an increase in money growth in the second half of 1981. The yen had
depreciated betweeen 1979 and 1980 but then appreciated into 1981,
assisting the disinflation.16
Germany met the second oil price increase with a cut in the
growth rate of central bank money from 10% per annum in the first half
of 1979 to 5% in the first half of 1980, with interest rates moving in
the opposite direction. Price and wage inflation rose into 1980 and
161n February 1980 the Bank of Japan demonstrated its independence and
its intention of keeping inflation low by for the first time ever
raising the official discount rate during the budget debate in the Diet.16
unemployment was still falling. The Bundesbank evidently saw this as
the time when control over inflation had to be asserted; it also
attributed part of the tightness of monetary policy in 1981 to the need
to stem the depreciation of the currency; and it regarded the budget
deficit as another cause to maintain monetary tightness.
Recession started in 1980, and unemployment began its ascent in
the middle of the year. From 2.9% (standardized definition) in the
second quarter of 1980, unemployment kept increasing until it reached
more than 8% three years later. Low money growth (4%) andthe recession
continued for over two years, with recovery getting under way only in
1983, when central bank money growth was increased to near 8%. Wage and
price inflation were surprisingly strong through 1982, with CPI
inflation still above 5%, and wages and the GNP deflator rising more
than 4% in 1982. The continuing wage increases and weakness of the
Deutschemark were the main factor ensuring the maintenance of monetary
tightness through 1982. The Bundesbank was clearly determined to move
the core inflation rate down from about 4%, the rate before the oil
shock, closer to zero, and was willing to pay the price of a long
recession and rising unemployment. It does not appear that the oil
price shock itself played a large part in creating this recession in
Germany.
The U.K. succeeded in bringing its inflation rate down in this
same period, but here the oil price shock played only a small part.
Sterling appreciated as the price of oil increased; wage inflation
likewise increased from 1979 to 1980. Noney growth (all definitions)17
was kept well below the inflation rate and nominal interest rates
increased. A recession started in the second quarter of l980 over the
six quarters from the end of 1979 the unemployment rate more than
doubled to reach a level of 10.2%. Wage inflation came down but did not
fall below 10% until the middle of 1983.
Under the Medium Term Financial Strategy announced in 1980
monetary growth (M3) was to be steadily reduced along with the public
sector borrowing requirement. Both money growth and the PSBR initially
exceeded target levels but were reduced steadily, and with the pressure
of rising unemployment wage and price inflation finally fell. By 1983
and 1984 U.K. inflation was close to U.S. levels. However unemployment
rates were well above those in the U.S. and were showing very little
sign of recovery. The monetary situation was once again confused, this
time because the demand function for sterling M3 appeared to be
shifting.
During the period from 1979 to 1983 the U.S., Germany and the
U.K. each undertook a period of extremely restrictive policy designed to
break inflationary momentum. Each created a major recession, and in
Germany and the U.K. a long—term increase in unemployment. Each did
succeed in bringing down inflation. The second oil price increase was
more important in determining the timing of the U.S. policy measures
than those in the other two countries. Even so, both the U.S. and the
U.K. would have in any event had to deal with the high inflations they
were suffering before the oil price shock.18
The German disinflation of 1980—83 is in many respects puzzling.
Relative to the U.S. and Britain, it accomplished little on the
inflation front. Year over year the CPI inflation rate peaked at 6.3%,
compared with its minimum of 2.7% in 1978; the GNP deflator never rose
more than 4.8%', compared with its minimum of 3.6% in 1976. Wage
inflation peaked in 1980 at a little over 7%. By the time monetary
policy was relaxed in 1983, the GNP deflator was rising at 3%. During
this period the unemployment rate increased from 2.9% to more than 8%.
There are two puzzling questions. First, why did the relatively low
inflation produce so much determination to maintain restrictive
policies? The answer here starts from the Bundesbank's stern views on
the dangers of inflation, and on its failure to hit its money targets
(see Table 5 below) in 1976 through 1978. It was afraid that inflation
would get out of hand. Second, why did those policies have so large an
effect on unemployment and so little effect on inflation?It is not at
all clear why the German Phillips curve appears to be so flat during
that period. Nor is it clear why the Bundesbank pressed so hard on
money growth rather than trying to produce a more gradual disinflation,
such as had been achieved by the Bank of Japan.
Here the contrast between Germany and Japan is most interesting.
The Bank of Japan clearly had achieved credibility by 1980. It is hard
though to credit the view that the Bundesbank lacked credibility. Up to
1979 it is difficult to tell the monetary policies of the two banks
apart——including an increase in money growth at the end of 1978 and an
'7At its quarter over same quarter a year before peak, GNP deflator
inflation in 1980:2 was 5.7%.19
increase in inflation in 1980. Once again wage behavior seems to be
key: 3apanese workers were willing to take a real wage cut; German
workers obtained higher nominal wage increases as inflation rose in
1980, arid rates of wage increase slackened only as unemployment rose.
(Bruno and Sachs, 1986).
The two oil shock episodes tell less clear stories about the
role of policy than might have been expected. The political lessons of
the U.S. and U.K. cases are clear: eventually the pressure to deal with
double digit inflation becomes overwhelming. But the failure of the
Bundesbank's restraint in the years following the first oil shock to pay
off in the second oil shock raises important questions about both the
role of monetary targets and credibility in monetary policy.
The Aftermath.
The U.S. rebound from the 1982 recession contrasts with the
failure of unemployment in Germany and the U.K. to recover
significantly. In contrast to the accommodative monetary policy of the
Fed, the Bundesbank kept central bank money growth at 5% or less until
1986. In the U.K. money growth, measured by the broader aggregates was
highly expansionary; though interest rates were increased in 1985 as
wage inflation resumed.
The major difference in policies was fiscal. Table 2 presents
fiscal policy data for the period 1980—1986. From 1982 on, U.S. fiscal20
Table 2: FISCAL POLICY, 1980—1986.
General government. 1980 198119821983198419851986
(Surplus/GNP, as %)





United States 0.5—0.9 1.3 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.1
Japan —0.2—0.6—0.7—0.5—1.0—0.5—0.3
Germany 0.2—0.1—1.5—1.4—0.2—0.60.3
U.K. —1.1—2.9—1.4 1.1 0.8—0.5 0.7
Source:OECDEconomic Outlook, Dec. 1984, Table 3 (for fiscal impulse,
1980—1983); Dec. 1986, Table 5 (for remaining data).
*Fjscal impulse is the increase in the structural budget deficit, as a
percentage of GNP.
policy was strongly expansionary; in 1982 and 1983 in particular German
fiscal policy was strongly contractionary. With both monetary and
fiscal policy contractionary in Germany, there was little to propel the
recovery from the recession. Although the dollar appreciation might
suggest a depreciation of the DM that would have allowed exports to
serve as the engine of growth, as they did to some extent in Japan, the
ON——tied in to its major trading partners through the EMS——did not in
fact depreciate much during this period.
Bundesbank annual reports note the policy tradeoff between
inflation and more rapid growth, express satisfaction with the pace of
the recovery, and regret over the failure until the end of 1986 for more
rapid real growth to have an effect on unemployment. The decision to
expand more slowly than in the United States was a deliberate one,21
reflecting a greater weighting on low inflation than the U.S. political
system imposes. The Bundesbank notes frequently that its prime task is
to preserve the value of money, and it is clear that maintaining low or
perhaps eventually even zero inflation is its chief long run goal. This
goal may reflect dissatisfaction with the outcome of policy between the
oil shocks when concern over unemployment was more evident in Bundesbarik
reports but the inflation rate stayed around 4%.
III. Monetary Targeting.
Between the oil shocks each of the central banks either
introduced monetary targeting, or shifted their procedures to focus more
on the money stock as an intermediate objective of policy. How, if at
all, did this change contribute to the secular reduction in inflation
experienced by each country?
United States.
Monetary targeting was introduced in the U.S. in March of 1975
target ranges were specified for Ml, M2 and N3 growth rates. As shown
in Table 3, Ml and M2 outcomes fell within their target ranges in the
first year, Ml even towards the bottom of its range.But in a pattern
that was to become quite standard, not all the money targets were
acheived simultaneously.22
Table 3: US MONEY GROWTH TARGETS AND OUTCOMES, 1975-1987.
Year Ml M2
Target Outcome Target Outcome Target Outcome
1975 5.0—7.5 5.3 8.5—10.5 9.7 10.0—12.0 12.3
1976 4.5—7.5 5.8 7.5—10.510.9 9.0—12.012.7
1977 4.5—6.5 7.9 7.0—10.0 9.8 8.5—11.5 11.7
1978 4.0—6.5 7.2 6.5— 9.0 8.7 7.5—10.0 9.5
1979 3.0—6.0 5.5 5.0— 8.0 8.3 6.0— 9.0 8.1
1980 4.0—6.5 7.3 6.0— 9.0 9.6 6.5— 9.5 10.2
1981 3.5—6.0 2.3' 6.0— 9.0 9.5 6.5— 9.5 11.4
1982 2.5—5.5 8.5 6.0— 9.0 9.2 6.5— 9.5 10.1
1983* 4.0—8.0 10.0 7.0—10.0 8.3 6.5— 9.5 9.7
1984 4.0—8.0 5.2 6.0— 9.0 7.7 6.0— 9.010.5
1985* 4.0—7.0 11.9 6.0— 9.0 8.6 6.0— 9.5 7.4
1986 3.0—8.0 15.2 6.0— 9.0 8.9 6.0— 9.0 8.8
1987 5.5— 8.5 5.5— 8.5
Mean 7.7 9.1 10.2
Std.dev.2 3.3 0.8 1.6
Std.err3 2.6 0.7 0.9
Curn.excess4 29.6% 14.3% 20.0%
Source: Isard and Rojas—Suarez (1986), Table 35, p.84, for data through
1985. Targets for 1987 and 1986 outcomes are from "Monetary Policy
Report to the Congress", Federal Reserve Bulletin, April 1987, 239—254.
Note: Data for targets and outcomes are for then current definitions.
*These are target ranges announced at the start of the year. Targets
were rebased in mid—year.
'-Boththe target and reported outcome for Ml are for Ml adjusted for
shifts into NOW accounts, i.e. numbers here are lower than in Figure 4.
2Standarddeviation.
Mean square difference between outcome and center of target range.
Cumulative excess of final level of the actual money stock over level
that would have been produced by growth at the mid—point of the target
range each year, starting from initial level.
Monetary targeting did not help prevent the inflationary buildup
between 1976 and 1979, in part because of data difficulties. There are
significant differences between money stock measures reported at the
time, and measures based on subsequent data revisions and
redefinitions.18 The period from 1976 saw rising Ml (new definition)
181n particular, the 5.5% Ml growth reported in Table 2 for 1979 was for
the then Mi—A definition of money, which excluded non—bank checkable
deposits. The growth rate for Mi—B, which included the latter deposits
and is close to current Ml, was nearly 2% higher.23
growth and steadily declining target ranges for Ni——part of the then
widely espoused gradualist strategy for reducing the inflation rate. Ni
growth (new definition) rose sharply at the beginning of 1977,
succeeding in keeping nominal interest rates falling until late in 1978
as the recovery proceeded fast. But by the then current definitions, Ni
growth fell in 1978, and was even lower in 1979, suggesting at the time
that monetary policy was not especially expansionary. Nonetheless the
inflation rate steadily increased, from less than 6% at the end of 1976
to near 9% at the end of 1979. Rapid output growth, propelled in part
by a rising full employment deficit and falling real price of oil, was
possible with little rise in the money growth rate because of rising
velocity, caused in part by higher interest rates and in part by a shift
out of Mi (both the case of the missing money and the case of the
creation of new forms of checkable deposit).
From the viewpoint of monetary control, the period from 1976 to
1979 is interesting for the fact that the Fed clearly intended to move
the inflation rate down through gradual reduction of the growth rate of
the various money stocks, that in terms of then available data it seemed
to be doing that from 1977 to 1979 (the growth rate of each of the M's
falls in Table 3 during that period) ,butthat it nonetheless turns out
to have been feeding the inflation.
With the shift in monetary policy at the end of 1979, money
targets were to receive more weight and interest rates were to be
allowed to fluctuate more. But in its first two years, the new regime
had to deal with the effects on the demand for money of financial24
deregulation. The Fed declared targets for two measures of Ni that were
then being used, and in 1980 came close to meeting then. In 1981
however it was significantly below its Ml target'9, and in any event at
that time had declared targets for four different Ml measures, together
with M2, M3, and bank credit. Aside from the undershooting of the Ml
target in 1981, the Fed was above on all targets specified in Table 3 in
the years 1980—1982 that it was supposedly following monetary targets.
Nonetheless, it was during this period that the Fed broke the
inflationary momentum of the previous twenty years——and the monetary
targets assisted in that endeavor. The reason is that the
unprecedentedly high nominal interest rates of 1980 and 1981 would not
have been politically possible without noney targets as the supposed
guides for monetary policy. When in August 1982 it became clear that
the recession and disinflation were well under way, and with high
interest rates exacerbating the developing international debt problem,
the money targets gave way, with Mi money growth exceeding 12% in the
next year and N2 money growth exceeding 17%.
The high rates of money growth are consistent with the increase
in the demand for real balances that comes with the end of an
inflationary period, or more prosaically with a reduction in the nominal
interest rate. As nominal interest rates decline and the quantity of
real balances demanded increases, the central bank is faced with the
choice of whether to supply money more rapidly than simple nominal GNP
targeting would imply, or whether to force the increase in real balances
19The target in Table 3 is for Mi—B, close to current definitions of
money.25
through further disinflation. So long as money growth targets are not
sacrosanct, and provided the monetary authority can exercise self—
control, the growth rate of money can indeed be temporarily increased.
Even beyond the normal increase in the demand for real balances that
comes from a reduction in interest rates, the U.S. disinflation seems to
have seen a shift in the Ml demand function.20
Instability of the demand for Ml is in part a result of
regulatory changes and innovations in the monetary system that have
changed the nature of both Ml and M2. With most interest rate controls
on bank liabilities removed, the pace of financial innovation that
affects Ml demand is likely to slow, but it is certainly the fate of
central bankers to contend with shifts in the demand function for money
in future as well.
The extraordinary feature of US monetary policy in the 1980's
has been its success at reducing the inflation rate despite extremely
high rates of money growth. And, in the period since 1984, highly
variable money growth has been fully compatible with steady real output
growth——with 1987 likely to be another year of moderate growth and
moderate inflation despite 15% Ml growth in 1986.
Despite its consistent failure to achieve money targets, the Fed
is required by law to announce them. That requirement serves a useful
purpose, which is to force the Fed in advance to explain its choice of
20Rasche (1986) presents the results of a comprehensive re—examination
of U.S. money demand functions, concluding that while the shift in the
demand for money function cannot be adequately explained, it can be
simply parameterized, and that money demand functions therefore continue
to play a useful role in the setting of money targets.26
targets, and to explain ex post its failure to achieve them. I take up
below the question of whether it should be forced to adhere to them more
closely.
Japan.
We have already seen how Japan dealt with its inflation problem
decisively and at high cost immediately following the first oil shock.
Up to the end of the Bretton Woods system, Japanese macroeconomic
policy, sheltered behind capital controls, had been driven by the
current account of the balance of payments and the fixed exchange rate.
Current account deficits produced contractionary policy and a growth
slowdown; surpluses turned the stop sign to go. Money growth had been
high and variable, and there was very little other than the exchange
rate to guide policy. The domestic financial markets were repressed,
with monetary policy operating to a large extent through rationing and
moral suasion. (Suzuki, 1980; Feldman, 1986)
With the exchange rate anchor for monetary policy gone in 1973,
the Bank of Japan switched to domestic price stability as the maim
criterion for policy, with the strategic aim of gradually reducing the
inflation rate, and with the money stock as an intermediate policy
objective.21 It took decisive action in 1974 by reducing the growth
rate of (M2+CD's) to 11%, less than half the value of the previous year.
211n the Translator's Note to Suzuki (1980), Greenwood states that the
Bank of Japan announced its intention to pursue monetary targets in July
1974. This probably refers to an internal Bank of Japan decision; money
stock projections were first announced in 1978.27
So strong and sudden a contraction produced a serious recession.
But by the middle of 1975 the inflation rate was below double digits,
and it has stayed there; indeed it continued falling virtually
throughout except for a small rise during the second oil crisis. Since
the beginning of 1982 the inflation rate has not exceeded 2.5% on a year
over year basis. Money growth has contined to fall with the inflation
rate.
Although the Bank of Japan has annual money growth targets it
does not announce them (Suzuki, 1985). Rather the Bank each quarter
publishes a projection of the growth rate of (M2+CD's) for the four
quarters ending at the end of that quarter.Data for fourth quarter














Sources: For 1978 through 1983, BIS Annual Report, 1983, p.71; for
later years, BIS Annual Report, for 1986 actual, IFS.
Note: Data are for fourth quarter of each year.
' Standard deviation
2 (Mean square difference between actual and mean of projection) x
4, to transform error to an annual rate.
targets for the years from 1978 are shown in Table 4•22
22These data differ somewhat from those presented in Neltzer (1986),
Table 1.28
Suzuki (1985) explains the use of projections rather than
targets as giving the central bank flexibility and freeing it from
political pressures. In addition, this method of targeting has the
benefit of largely describing what has already been done. It also means
that divergences from target in the current quarter appear to be only
one quarter their actual size at an annual rate. Even so, the outcomes
are reasonably close to the projections.23 Note further that the
general trend of both projections and actuals is negative, which is
consistent with the gradual decline of the inflation rate in Japan.
The projected growth rates do change cyclically though. There was a
nearly 3% per annum increase in the growth rate in 1981 (this can be
seen also in Figure 4) and a more than 2% increase in the rate of growth
between 1983 and 1986.
Remarkably, though, the standard errors in Tables 3 and 4 do not
show the Fed doing a significantly worse job than the Bank of Japan in
meeting the M2 target or projection. Using the "standard errors" in the
two tables, the Fed appears to come closer to attaining its N2 target
than the Bank of Japan does to its (M2+CD) projection.24 Further, the
standard deviation of the M2 outcome is lower in the U.S. than in Japan.
Germany.
231t is not possible to infer from Table 4 how accurately the Bank of
Japan meets its annual targets. One possibility is that the error
would increase more than proportionately with time because the known
initial conditions are further away; the other is that the Bank would
have more time to correct any errors.
24The comparison is not straightforward because while the Japanese data
are end of period, the U.S. data are quarterly averages, which biases
the comparison against the Japanese results. See also the preceding
footnote.29
The Bundesbank, the first central bank to announce money
targets, has targeted "central bank money" since the end of 1974.
Targets and outcomes are presented in Table 5•2 Central bank money
consists of non—bank currency plus 16.6% of demand deposits, 12.4% of
time deposits and borrowed funds, and 8.1% of savings deposits. In
origin it is equal to currency plus required reserves, a concept that
could be called the "required base", except that the required reserves
are calculated using reserve ratios of 1974. The Bundesbank describes
it rather as a weighted sum of components of the broad money stock, with
weights reflecting the liquidity of the components.


















Source: Isard and Rojas—Suarez (1986) ,Table35, p.84, through 1985;
Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank (Jan.1987) p.2 for 1986
and 1987 data.
Note: For 1975, target is December over December; for 1976 to 1978
year—over—year; for remaining years fourth quarter over fourth
quarter.
' Mean square difference between outcome and mid—point of target
range.
2A useful account through 1982 is contained in Schlesinger (1983) .See
also "The longer—term trend and control of the money stock", Monthly
Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Vol.37, 1 (Jan.1985), pp13—26.30
Up till 1978 the target was quite high (relative to later
years), and the outcome higher. From 1979 the targets were given as a
range. The Bundesbank typically indicates where in the range it expects
to cone out, and why: accordingly "it has not been possible for the
announced target trange] to be interpreted arbitrarily by the general
public or by the Bundesbank itself".26 The target range was gradually
reduced from 1979; although the actual growth rate of CBM did not fall
steadily, it was lower after 1978 than before, and except in 1986 within
or below the range. Typically the Bundesbank was aiming for the lower
part of its range.
The Bundesbank provides a precise rationale for the target,
which is obtained by a process essentially of targeting nominal GNP.
There is an allowance for unavoidable inflation, plus growth of real
GNP, typically at the growth rate of potential output, plus an estimate
of velocity change27. The real growth rate is that of potential output
because the Bundesbank tries rigorously to limit the temptation to
engage in countercyJ.ical policy. It appears to allow itself to adjust
for unemployment only within the target range: for instance, in 1982 and
1983 it aimed for the upper half of the target range explicitly because
unemployment was high.28 While it emphasizes that its primary
responsibility is to naintain the value of money, it permits deviations
in response to exchange rate movements——particularly in light of the
26Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank, 1980, p.30.
27!1ore recently the Bundesbank has stopped making an allowance for
velocity change, on the grounds that it is unpredictable.
28Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank, 1983, p.33.31
Deutschmark's role in the EMS—-and also interest rate movements. Any
deviation generates a detailed explanation.29
The Fed's justification of its targets is generally less
precise, probably because it presents ranges for four variables and
sometimes more. Nor do past failures receive a careful explanation such
as that of the Bundesbank, probably again for the same reason.
The targeting procedures and explanations provided by the
Bundesbank appear convincing and fully serious. By comparison with the
procedures of the Fed and the Bank of Japan, they raise the question of
whether CBM is the optimal target, whether there should be only one
target, and whether targets are preferable to projections. The outcome
of the Bundesbank's policies also raises the question of whether a
central bank should be directed to consider the impacts of its actions
on unemployment as well as the value of money.
United Kingdom.
The Bank of England adopted M3 targets for internal use in 1973,
and began announcing the targets in 1976. The official explanation of
their adoption stressed the fight against inflation and the need to
anchor expectations.3° The U.K. has continued to publish an M3 (since
1977 sterling M3) target since then, but since 1982 has added other
targets, and in 1987 is tending to place more weight on MO, the monetary
base. Table 6 presents U.K. targets and outcomes.
29For example, "The monetary target for 1987", Monthly Report of the
Deutsche Bundesbank, (Jan. 1987), pp.1—2.
301drawfreely in this section on Fischer (1987).32










1983 7.0—11.0 9.5 7.0—11.014.0
1984 6.0—10.011.9 4.0—8.05.7
1985 5.0— 9.016.5 3.0—7.03.3




Source: Isard and Rojas—Suarez (1986), Table 35, p.84, through 1985.
1986 data from OECD Economic Outlook, (Dec.1986), Table 1.
Note: Targets were also specified for two years for a broader liquidity
aggregate.
*Data through September.
Table 6 should be read in conjunction with Figure 2, showing CPI
inflation. The first few years of monetary targeting appeared
successful, both in meeting targets (except for 1977) and in bringing
down the inflation rate. But then in 1980 M3 grew far in excess of the
target range as inflation returned to nearly 20%. The very high rate of
growth of M3 in 1980 can be explained as a result of reintermediation
following regulatory changes and the end of foreign exchange controls.
The Bank of England's failure to control its growth may be attributed to
its reluctance to push interest rates higher than they already were at a
time of sterling strength.33
Because the sterling M3 demand function appeared to be breaking
down, the Bank of England added both an Ml and a broader monetary
aggregate target in 1982 and 1983.It was not successful in bringing
those variables within the target range either. Since it appears that
MO, the monetary base has a stable relationship with nominal GNP, the
Bank has more recently switched to announcing MO targets. It has
succeeded in hitting these at the same time as inflation has come down,
though it emphasizes that it does not target MO in order to control the
money supply through the base. Rather it targets MO because of the
apparent stability of its demand function, aiming to hit that target
through adjustments of market interest rates.
The Bank of England has not been successful in achieving its
monetary targets, and in the period up to 1982, was not successful
either at controlling the inflation rate. Since then inflation has come
down though M3 growth has remained high and unstable, and unemployment
has been high and stable.
Operating Procedures.
There has been much controversy in the United States over the
Fed's operating procedures.3' It was argued that the Fed, although
specifying operating targets for monetary policy in terms of both
reserves and interest rates, was allowing the interest rate targets to
dominate, and therefore losing sight of the quantity targets.
31For a Federal Reserve view of the issues, see Lindsey (1986) for a
technical description of the operating procedures from 1979 to 1982, and
references, see Good±riend er al (1986).34
In Japan, Germany, and the U.K., monetary policy is operated in
the short run largely through control of interest rates, and in Japan
and Germany also through control over the quantity of central bank
credit provided the banking system.32 Open market operations are
thought of as a means of influencing interest rates and thereby the
quantity of money demanded, rather than controlling the money base and
thus through a stable money multiplier the supply of money.
These procedures and their rationale would be severely
criticized if the Fed were to espouse them explicitly. Nonetheless, they
have not hampered the ability of the Bank of Japan and the Bundesbank to
attain their monetary targets. Of course, both the Bank of Japan and
the Bundesbank hope to develop more efficient money and capital markets
in which to conduct open market operations, and the trend is clearly in
that direction.33 Still, it is difficult examining German and Japanese
monetary policy to believe that much of the blame for the Feds failures
to hit its monetary targets can derive from imperfections in the way it
tries to control the money stock, as opposed to conscious decisions that
the targets should not be met in a particular period.34
32Feldman (1986) provides a detailed description of the Japanese
financial system. Suzuki (1986) compares U.S. and Japanese financial
innovations; Suzuki (1987) is an extremely accessible account of the
liberalization and internationalization of Japanese financial markets,
and the implications for monetary policy. Descriptions of Bundesbank
operating procedures can be found from time to time in the Monthly
Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank "The Bundesbank's transactions in
securities under repurchase agreements", March 1983, pp.23—30 is useful.
The Bank of England's The Development and Operation of Monetary Policy
1960—1983 describes the money supply process and decisions.
Irk Japan the large government budget deficit and the consequent
increase in the supply of bonds have been instrumental in the
development of the money and bond markets.
34This argument is made, on the basis of Japanese operating procedures,
by Dotsey (1986).35
IV.Conclusions.
The record of policy reviewed in this paper raises questions
about the role of monetary targets, gradualism and credibility. In the
background there are also questions about the flexible exchange rate
system.
Monetary Targeting.
Monetary targeting serves the valuable purpose of forcing the
central bank to announce its intentions for the next year, and of
explaining why it failed to meet them this year. Provided the targets
are taken seriously, targeting lends a coherence to monetary policy that
operating by the "touch and feel" of the market does not. Even where
targeting has not been successful, as in the U.K., the failures suggest
where to look for an explanation, and to some extent how to improve
policy.
The adoption of monetary targeting does not necessarily imply
inactive policies. None of the four countries, including Japan, has
tried to keep money growth constant and all have responded to the
business cycle, to velocity shocks, and to the exchange rate.
Nominal GNP Taretina: The activist procedure explicitly followed by the
Bundesbank is the right way of doing nominal GNP targeting (Taylor,
1985). Each year a target is chosen for nominal GNP, based on the
desired breakdown between inflation and real growth. The monetary
target is then derived from target GNP and a forecast of velocity.
Approval of targeting in that fashion does not however imply that the
target real growth rate should always be the growth rate of potential
output, or that the target rate of inflation need necessarily be zero.36
How Many Goals of Policy? The Bundesbank and the Bank of Japan both
have as their main task the preservation of the value of the currency.
The Bank of Japan was able to reduce the inflation rate after 1975
without an apparent cost in terms of higher unemployment. The
Bundesbank's policies from 1979, combined with tight fiscal policy,
succeeded in wringing inflation out of the system at the expense of much
higher unemployment. There was in Germany virtually none of the respite
from monetary tightness that the Fed provided in the U.S. in 1982 as the
recession worsened. By giving the central bank both real independence
and as its primary responsibility the maintenance of price stability,
which virtually absolves it from concern over unemployment, the legal
system may produce a deflationary bias in the economy. If there is a
significant probability that the central bank will be the main economic
policymaker——and the growing immobilization of countercyclical fiscal
policy makes that increasingly the case——there is good reason to require
it to give weight to unemployment as well as inflation when making its
decisions .
Projectionsv. Taraets: The choice between "projections" and "targets"
is a subtle one. The Bank of Japan has in the last few years maintained
stable money growth and stable projections, and presumably therefore it
has also been attaining its unpublished targets. At the same time, by
projecting only for the current quarter, it leaves itself great
35The question arises of whether central bank policy has any influence
on real variables like the rate of unemployment. There is much evidence
that expansionary policy can in the short run lead to an expansion of
output; if some hysteresis—like view of the economy is correct, then
such short—run changes in output tend to be permanent.37
flexibility for any longer period. Its credibility appears sufficient
for the projections to be regarded as targets. It is unlikely that
other central banks can rely on being able to achieve similar "targeting
without targets" in the near future.
How Many Money Targets? The Bundesbank and the Bank of Japan have each
elected to focus on just one monetary variable, the Fed on many, and the
Bank of England sometimes one and sometimes more. There is a strong
theoretical justification for the multi—target view, arising from the
fact that the central bank in fact influences many monetary variables,
each of which has a slightly different and uncertain effect on ultimate
target variables——and feedback from which makes it easier for the
monetary authority to decipher changes in the economy. By using several
targets, including perhaps interest rates (and a rule for deciding how
to compromise when they cannot all be attained) the central bank reduces
the uncertainty about the effects of its actions on the economy.For
instance, the failure of the Fed to meet its Ni targets on many
occasions appears less serious when it does come close to achieving the
other targets.
Nonetheless, the clarity of the one—variable approach is
appealing, both in its impact as a signal, and for the consistency it
might force on the central bank. If it could be shown empirically that
there was little to be gained (in an expected utility sense) by having
more than one money target——for instance because the correlation between
one of the monetary variables closely controllable by the central bank
and nominal GNP was exceptionally close—-it might be worthwhile
narrowing the list of targets to one.38
In both Japan and Germany the single targeted monetary variable
has smaller variance of velocity than that of other money concepts.36
In the U.K. M3 velocity has been highly unstable, which partly accounts
for the shift to MO targeting. In the U.S. M2 velocity is more stable
than that of Ml, though less stable than the velocity of 113.On the
basis of the stability of its velocity and the Fed's success in hitting
that target, 112 currently would appear to be a useful target variable——
even though the collection of assets in 112 has little analytic
coherence, and it would remain to be seen whether a switch to 112
targeting would put Goodhart's Law into effect and destroy the relative
stability of 112 velocity.
Gradualism and Credibility.
After a sharp change in money growth and a deep recession in
1974, the Bank of Japan succeeded in gradually reducing both money
growth and inflation over the succeeding decade, with an interruption
from the second oil shock. The short sharp shock worked for the Bank of
Japan. But it did not work for the Bundesbank. After bringing down
inflation in 1973—74, the Bundesbank faced generally rising inflation
until the second oil shock and then was only able to reduce inflation by
creating and maintaining high unemployment. Similarly, both the Fed and
t1Bak of England had to create massive recessions in the early
eiepget the Lnflatlon rate down, despite their successes at
the first oil shock
'$*' in Isard and Rojas—Suarez (1986) Table 32, of
c&ae te predictability of velocity over the next year rather than its
variabzlityasthe more relevant measure of the suitability of a given
target variable, but an practice predictability and variability are
closely related.39
It is easy to believe that the Bank of England lacked
credibility, and that the Fed lacked credibility until 1982. But why
should that have been true of the Bundesbank? Perhaps, though it is
unlikely, it had tolerated too high inflation in the late seventies.
Any analysis that stresses credibility has to explain why the inflation
rate came down in Japan with only one recession, while it took two or
three recessions for each of the other countries, and in two of them
prolonged high unemployment.
The difference nay lie much more with the workforce than with
the policymakers. Whereas nominal wage increases rose in each of the
other three countries in the second oil shock, Japanese wage inflation
did not. If it had, the Bank of Japan would have created another
recession. That threat is not sufficient to stop wage increases——in
evidence, note that the Bundesbank's implicit threat had to be carried
out when wage inflation increased in Germany in 1981.
U.S. policy after 1982 also suggests that credibility is not a
simple function of money growth performance (Blanchard,1987). Ml growth
in the U.S. has been higher in the period since 1982 than over any
comparable period. There has been no perceptible impact on sensitive
asset market variables, such as interest rates, let alone on wages or
prices. Obviously the markets believe that the Ml growth signifies
nothing about future inflation. They are probably right.
The lesson is that someone with credibility can do and explain
sensible actions that at other times would be viewed with the greatest
suspicion. Further, I believe the lesson is also that credibility is40
earned by successful outcomes, rather than by holding rigorously to
intermediate targets. This is the case for not attempting to force
central banks to hold strictly to their money targets in the face of
shifts in velocity or other relevant circumstances.
Exchange Rates.
Exchange rates and current account imbalances have received
little explicit attention in this paper. In the U.K. and Germany
monetary policy has at times been dominated by the behavior of the
exchange rate. That was true in the United States in 1978, and may be
about to happen in Japan now.
However this does not suggest that the U.S., Japan and Germany
will anytime soon be willing to forego monetary independence in the
interests of stabilizing exchange rates. Bundesbank reports make it
clear time and time again that it views price stability as the
overriding goal. European countries that want to accept or attain the
German inflation rate can join the EMS, and Britain may do that soon.
The U.S. is less concerned with inflation relative to unemployment than
is Germany, which means that a newly fixed dollar—DN exchange rate would
suffer the same fate it did in the early seventies——particularly given
divergent fiscal policies. Since Japan's inflation preferences are
different from those of the U.S., and its trading patterns are different
from those of Europe, it is unlikely to fix exchange rates against
either the dollar or the D1.41
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Figure 3. Unemployment Rates
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Fig-tire 4. Money Growth, 2 Oil Shocks
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Figure 6. Government Deficits, 2 Oil Shocks
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Figure 8. CPIInflation,2 Oil Shocks
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Figure 9. Real Growth, 2 Oil Shocks
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